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Introduction 
Ten years ago only a handful of very rudimentary contingent valuation studies had been 
conducted in developing countries; at the time the conventional wisdom was that it simply could 
not be done. The problems associated with posing hypothetical questions to low-income, 
perhaps illiterate respondents were assumed to be so overwhelming that one should not even try. 
Today we have come full circles; it is now assumed by many environmental and resource 
economists working in developing countries that CV surveys are straightforward and easy to do. 
Because the contingent valuation business in the United States has been such an academic war 
zone for the past few years, many people are unaware of what a flourishing business contingent 
valuation studies are becoming in other parts of the world. Bilateral donor agencies and the 
international development backs are increasing putting contingent valuation techniques to use in 
project and policy appraisal as put of their everyday operations work. Just to illustrate the point, 
a single Latin American department in the World Bank has now funded a sufficient number of 
CV studies that its management is considering organizing an in-house conference on its 
experience using the results of CV studies, the performance of different contractors, and ways of 
reducing the costs of future CV work. Moreover, in light of the controversy over the use of 
CVM in the United States, most 
future applications of the CVM are likely to be in developing countries. r ` 
'. 
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In this paper I discuss some of the issues that have arisen and some of the lessons learned over 
the last ten years about administering CV surveys in developing countries. The discussion is 
organized around five distinct issues: (1) ethical problems in conducting contingent valuation 
surveys; (2) explaining what a contingent valuation study is all about; (3) interpreting responses 
to contingent valuation questions; (4) setting referendum prices; and (5) constructing joint 
public-private CV scenarios. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it will hopefully provide 
the reader with insights into some of the issues involving in conducting CV surveys in 
developing countries. 
1. Ethical problems in conducting contingent valuation surveys 
At the 1994 Annual Meetings of the American Economics Association, during a panel 
discussion about the findings of the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's Expert Panel Report on the Contingent Valuation Method, Prof. Kenneth 
Arrow remarked that the contingent valuation method is fine, except when it is not. Most 
economists will interpret Prof. Arrow's aside to mean that contingent valuation (CV) studies are 
fine when the results are accurate and reliable, and clearly not so good when this is not the case. 
Of course, knowing when CV results are accurate reflections of individuals' preferences is not 
easy, and the CV literature is now full of various tests for internal and external consistency that 
have been proposed and are being used to help CV researchers assess the quality of their results. 
Absent from most of the current debate about the "goodness" of CV results has been a careful 
consideration of several ethical issues that arise in the implementation of the contingent 
valuation method as it is currently practiced in many developing countries. In this section of the 
paper I discuss some of the ethical problems with much of current CV research practices 
(including my own work), and argue that "good" CV research demands more than simply 
obtaining accurate and reliable results: it also requires that CV researchers conform to accepted 
ethical standards of research with human subjects. Simply put, CV researchers must treat 
respondents in developing countries with more respect, as citizens rather than experimental 
subjects. It is quite possible that a given CV survey can yield accurate and reliable survey results 
and still not be an ethically acceptable method for economic analysis. I begin this discussion 
with three examples from developing countries that highlight ethical dilemmas CV researchers 
have tended to ignore. 
(i) When is the use of a referendum elicitation procedure unethical? 
Although the merits of referendum-type question(s) are still being hotly debated, most CV 
practitioners still probably consider the use of one or two discrete choice questions the preferred 
elicitation method. The implementation of the discrete-choice approach requires that several 
split-samples of respondents receive different randomly-assigned prices for the good or service 
described in the CV scenario. Their responses are used to construct values for the study 
population. CV researchers have not seem troubled by the fact that giving different respondents 
different prices may spread confusion and misinformation about the real costs of addressing a 
problem of possibly great public concern. 
For example, I used a referendum question in two recent CV studies conducted for the World 
Bank. In a CV survey conducted in November, 1994, designed to estimate households' demand 
for improved water services in a small town in Mozambique, I randomly assigned five different 
prices to subsamples of respondents. In June, 1995, our study team returned to the town where 
the survey was conducted to brief a group of local government officials (including the District 
Administrator) and community leaders on the results of the CV survey. After the formal briefing 
there was lengthy group discussion about the policy implications of the findings, during which 
one elderly man, a neighborhood leader, said that he had followed the implementation of the 
survey closely and talked to many respondents after their interviews. He reported that he 
generally agreed 
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with our findings. There was, however, one thing he did not understand: why were different 
households asked to pay different prices? Why should one household be charged more than 
another for a water connection? This did not seem fair or necessary to him. 
Of course, it was never our intention to leave the impression that different households in the 
community would be charged different prices for a water connection, but that seems likely to 
have been one outcome of our CV survey. Our use of a referendum approach with different 
prices may well have increased public uncertainty and confusion about the costs of improved 
water services in this town. 
In July, 1995, in another CV survey for the World Bank, I helped design and manage a survey of 
a few hundred households in three areas of Semarang, Indonesia, a city of 1.2 million people on 
the northern coast of Java. We worked in three districts (kelurahans) of the city. Each 
neighborhood unit has an officially designated leader who had to be informed about the survey 
by higher level community leaders before the survey could take place. After such permission 
was secured, we sent a team of enumerators and a field supervisor to the neighborhood to 
interview all of the sample households in a relatively short period of time (generally 2-3 hours). 
In this way, respondents would supposedly have little time to discuss the interview with other 
respondents before the latter were interviewed. 
However, in one community the neighborhood leader dropped in on an early interview 
unannounced and heard the referendum price offered the respondent. This price happened to be 
the highest of the four prices we used, and the neighborhood leader was quite concerned. He 
quickly spread word throughout the neighborhood to answer "no" to our valuation question; he 
felt that the improved water and sanitation program offered in our CV scenario was simply too 
expensive at the highest of our referendum prices. Obviously our problem arose in part because 
the field supervisor and the enumerator were unable to exclude the neighborhood leader from a 
supposedly private interview (although in justice to them both, this is not a easy thing to do in 
Indonesia). But it also illustrates (1) how quickly information can spread in a close-knit urban 
community, (2) how seriously some community members may take the information presented to 
them in a CV scenario, and (3) how easily a community can be confused by using different 
prices and other split-sample experiments. 
CV researchers may well argue that any such misinformation is the fault of the survey designer, 
who is supposed to craft language for scenarios that inform the respondent that the choice is 
"just" hypothetical. Respondents are thus told to "suppose" or "imagine" that the choice to be 
described is not actually or necessarily going to be offered. This is often a nuance that is lost in 
translation; in some cases the conditional subjunctive may actually not be translatable. 
A good CV scenario is designed to be realistic and for respondents to take the "hypothetical" 
choice seriously. In practice, the more seriously a respondent considers the choice posed, the 
less hypothetical the scenario is likely to seem. This is particularly true for goods and services 
with large use vales that are commonly provided by government--such as infrastructure 
services. The less hypothetical the provision of the good or service described in the CV 
scenario, the more likely the different referendum prices will confound serious public discussion 
of the issue at hand. 
CV researchers generally assume that they will sample large populations, and that there will be 
little chance that one respondent will talk with another. In such a case, perhaps it can be 
assumed that any misinformation communicated to a relatively small number of respondents 
about the price (or other aspects) of a hypothetical good or service will not be widely discussed 
or influence public debate. But in small towns, villages, or urban neighborhoods in developing 
countries, such an assumption is quite often unwarranted. 
Even in large capital cities, a sample of 1000-2000 households is not so small that a CV survey 
can be discussed by many people--some perhaps quite knowledgeable about the problem 
addressed or influential in shaping public discourse about its solution. As a perhaps not very 
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typical example of widespread public discussion of a CV scenario, I was interviewed on 
National Bulgarian Radio about a CV survey I was conducting in September, 1995, on 
households' willingness to pay for air quality improvements in Sofia. At the beginning of the 
show, I made a brief statement about the objectives of the CV survey and the management plan 
used in the CV scenario. The radio host then asked the listening audience to respond to some 
selected questions from our survey instrument, and people called in to say how they would 
answer the questions and to give their impressions of air quality in Sofia. I have been told that 
the discussion in Bulgarian was quite lively, and that people really wanted to know exactly how 
they would pay for air quality improvements--and why they had to pay. Several callers felt it 
was the governments' responsibility to pay for such environmental quality improvements, not 
theirs. The "hypothetical" aspect of the air quality management plan described in the CV 
scenario seems to have been largely lost. 
This issue of the spread of misinformation arises not only with the prices used in the referendum 
elicitation method, but with scenario construction and many other split sample experiments 
commonly used by CV researchers. For example, Richard Carson et al.'s CV survey in support 
of the State of Alaska's case against Exxon in the Exxon- Valdez oil spill is one of the finest, 
most professional CV surveys conducted to date. In this survey Carson et al. crafted a CV 
scenario that described an oil spill containment technology called a "Norwegian sea fence" that 
could be used in the high seas of Prince Williams Sound to contain future oil spills. 
Respondents in the survey were asked whether they would vote for or against a rapid response 
oil spill containment force in Prince Williams Sound that would deploy this Norwegian sea 
fence if the implementation of the plan would cost their household a specified amount of 
money. But, of course, there is no such thing as a "Norwegian sea fence." The CV researchers 
told respondents that such a hypothetical technology existed so that they would believe the oil 
spill containment response force would be effective, and respondents would thus not reject the 
scenario as implausible (which it was). 
A CV researcher is more like a public opinion pollster than a market researcher. I believe that 
the act of engaging an individual in a conversation about issues of public concern obligees the 
researcher not only to accept certain ethical principles of research with human "subjects," but 
also to conform to additional ethical standards about the proper use of such information in a 
democratic society. 
(ii) How honest should one be about the institutional regime contemplated for delivering the 
"hypothetical" goods or services? 
In developing countries CV researchers often face a situation that many of their counterparts in 
industrialized countries would at first glance envy: the CV scenarios used in such surveys may 
not be hypothetical, but all too real. If the donors and governments that fund the CV surveys 
judge the results to be credible, the findings will likely be used in policy decisions. This 
movement from hypothetical to "real" CV scenarios raises a host of ethical concerns. 
To illustrate, it is common knowledge among the international construction and consulting firms 
carrying out infrastructure projects and providing technical assistance with World Bank 
financing that in many countries a substantial portion of the proceeds of World Bank loans are 
paid in kickbacks to government officials. A standard mechanism for paying such bribes to 
government officials is for international consulting firms to hire local counterpart firms, and to 
pay these local firms for services that are either overpriced or not rendered at all. These local 
firms then pay the kickbacks to government officials. 
Such siphoning off of foreign assistance by senior government officials does not often go 
unnoticed by a country's urban poor. They see government officials who earn modest salaries 
driving Mercedes and living in expensive homes. Suppose now that the World Bank is 
considering making loan to expand water and sanitation services in a country where such 
kickbacks are common, and that the CV researcher is asked to estimate households' willingness 
to pay for the benefits of such a project. The results of such a CV survey might be used as part 
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of a project feasibility study, pricing study, or cost-benefit analysis. 
Imagine that the CV researcher accepts the assignment and crafts a scenario asking a sample 
respondent to suppose that she could vote on whether or not the national government should 
borrow money from the World Bank to finance a new water and sewerage system for the 
nation's capital. The respondent is told that if the majority of people voted for the government 
to take the loan, a new water and sewer distribution system would be constructed, and her 
household would be assessed a specified amount of money to have the system extended into her 
neighborhood. If her household chose to do so, it could then connect to this system at a given 
monthly tariff month--in addition to the assessment fee, and connection and replumbing costs. 
If the majority of people voted against the plan, the government would not borrow the money 
and the new water and sewer system would not be built. 
Suppose then that during the pretest of the survey instrument, numerous respondents say that 
they do not want their government to borrow money from the World Bank because they know 
that much of the funds will not be used for the intended purposes, and in this regard they are in 
fact correct. If the survey instrument were implemented in this form, the results could 
substantially underestimate households' perceived benefits of the new water and sanitation 
system. Some might well argue that the instrument should be revised because the researcher's 
terms of reference were to measure the economic benefits of the new water and sanitation 
services, not the public's distrust of its government and concerns about whether World Bank 
funds would be properly used. So the researcher is instructed to eliminate any reference to the 
World Bank in the CV scenario, even though the World Bank does intend to use the results to 
appraisal a water and sanitation project in just the way that some of the respondents feared. 
Should the CV researcher serve his client in this manner and delete the references to World 
Bank financing in the scenario? Or does he bear some responsibility to be truthful to the 
respondents he is interviewing about the true purposes of the survey? 
(iii) Should respondents be compensated? If so, how? 
For at least the last decade anthropologists and sociologists working in the development field 
have harshly criticized economists' use of large-scale household surveys as "extractive," 
meaning that researchers extract data from respondents and give them little, if anything, in 
return. This point was made forcefully to me by the leader of a poor, informal squatter 
community on the outskirts of Guatemala city: "we want more than words from your survey." 
CV researchers need to give more careful thought to what they should return to the respondents 
and communities they work in. 
One thing that survey researchers could give respondents is money, but this is rarely done. 
Survey researchers will tell you that paying respondents will bias the results and wreck havoc 
with the selection of respondents and implementation of the field work. This may well be true 
in many instances, but it is also somewhat self-serving. Paying respondents would obviously 
cut in researchers' limited budgets, but that in itself does not mean it would not be a good thing 
to do. I have actually never seen any evidence of the effect that paying respondents in 
developing countries had on survey administration. Market research firms in the United States 
routinely pay people to participate in focus group discussions. 
Perhaps the most obvious thing CV researchers could do for respondents is to communicate their 
findings to the community where the research was conducted. There are many good reasons for 
doing this, not the least of which is that researchers are likely to gain new insights about their 
interpretations of some statistical analyses. But most importantly, the researcher owes the 
community a full account of what was learned. 
2. Explaining what a contingent valuation study is all about 
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The first difficulty a CV researcher often faces in administering a CV survey in a developing 
country is to explain to interviewers what the study is about. The concepts of economic value 
and "maximum willingness to pay" (or minimum compensation that a respondent is willing to 
accept) are often difficult for the researcher to translate and for some noneconomists to grasp. 
Open-ended willingness-to-pay questions require that the CV researcher convey the notion of 
the maximum amount an individual is willing to pay; this can be particularly difficult to 
translate. For example, in a CV study we conducted in Haiti, in response to an early version of 
an open-ended CV question, a respondent asked one of our interviewers, "What do you mean the 
maximum I would be willing to pay? You mean when someone has a gun to my head?" In fact, 
the CV researcher is trying to determine the maximum amount the respondent would be willing 
to pay for the hypothetical good or service in the context of the existing institutional regime 
within which individuals are free to allocate their personal financial resources. 
If a referendum elicitation procedure is used, respondents themselves will not need to be asked 
an open-ended question about the maximum they would be willing to pay for a hypothetical 
good or service, but the interviewers themselves will want to understand the reason for the 
split-sample experiment and the assignment of different prices to randomly selected 
respondents. One particularly common source of confusion relates to the distinction many 
people want to make between willingness and ability to pay. It is important for the CV 
researcher to clearly communicate to interviewers that the purpose of the valuation question is to 
determine what the respondent would do if she had to make a real economic commitment (i.e., 
faced an actual budget constraint). In other words, the objective of the CV study is to determine 
how much respondents are willing and able to pay. 
The classification scheme presented in Table 1 can often be useful to clarify this point. As 
shown, the total population of respondents can be envisaged as four groups. First, there are 
respondents who are willing and able to pay (cell 1). These are the ones the CV researcher 
wants to classify as accepting the CV scenario: they are both willing to pay for the hypothetical 
good or service and have "sufficient" income to do so. Second, there are respondents who are 
able but not willing to pay (cell 2). These respondents could pay in the sense that they have 
"sufficient" income, but they choose not to do so, presumably because they have other things on 
which they prefer to spend their money. 
A third group of respondents are willing but not able (cell 3). It is this group that typically 
causes noneconomists the most confusion. The argument is often made that individuals in this 
third group would like to purchase the hypothetical good or service iftheir income was higher. 
But in their current financial circumstances they are not able to pay. Noneconomists will often 
like to classify these people as willing to pay, but the CV researcher must emphasize that for the 
purposes of the study such individuals must be categorized as not willing to pay (i.e., not willing 
and able). 
A fourth group of individuals are not willing and not able to pay (cell 4). Respondents in this 
group cannot afford to pay for the hypothetical good or service. But even if their incomes 
increased by some specified amount, they would still not want to pay. These people should 
clearly be classified as not willing to accept the CV scenario. The important point to recognize 
is that demand for the hypothetical good or service is not likely to be a function solely of 
income. It is possible that increases in income will have a relatively small effect on willingness 
to pay for a specified good or service. 
3. Interpreting Responses to Contingent Valuation Questions 
One of the reasons that economists and survey researchers have been skeptical about the ability 
to conduct CV surveys in developing countries is the presumed difficulty of understanding and 
interpreting respondents' answers to sensitive or hypothetical questions. Such worries are often 
well-founded, and careful questionnaire development is needed. We faced a problem 
interpreting responses to the valuation questions in the CV survey we conducted in Semarang, 
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Indonesia. 
The CV scenario was designed to determine whether a household would vote in favor of having 
water and sewer lines installed in its neighborhood if everyone in the community had to pay a 
specified assessment fee (whether or not they connected), and then if water and sewer lines were 
installed, whether the household would choose to connect to them if a specified monthly tariff 
were charged. After the first couple of days of pretesting a CV questionnaire, we discovered 
that everyone was saying "yes" to everything, regardless of the assessment fee or monthly tariff 
offered to them. 
We stopped the pretesting and held a meeting with our team of enumerators to find out why 
everyone was answering "yes" to our valuation questions. During the course of a two-hour 
discussion, it became clear that respondents were in fact answering "yes, but ...," and then giving 
many different qualifications to their answer. The interviewers informed us that in Indonesia 
these were all polite ways of saying "no." We then developed a coded list of all the many ways a 
respondent might say "yes, but.." to our valuation questions and mean "no." 
Table 2 presents this list of different ways to say "no" and the number of times respondents gave 
each "yes, but" answer to the valuation question (regarding whether the respondent's household 
would want to connect to the new water and sewer lines if a specified monthly tariff would be 
charged). For example, of the 164 answers that we recorded as "no," 52 respondents (32%) 
answered "Yes, but I cannot afford it." Another 18% said, "I agree, but the costs are too high." 
These "yes, but" responses (50% of the total number of "no's") seem to be clearly negative and 
correctly classified as "no." 
However, another 30% of the respondents said, "I need to know others' opinion about the 
program before I decide." Our enumerators assured us that this was simply a polite way of 
saying "no," but to us the respondents' answer seemed reasonable. The assignment of such 
responses to the "no" category seems more uncertain than the previous two types of answers. 
Other answers listed in Table 2 also seem somewhat ambiguous and uncertain. We thus believe 
that the proportion of respondents that we have placed in the "no" categories for this valuation 
question is probably too high. We followed our enumerators' guidance in coding the answers, 
but in fact we believe our analytical results are an underestimate of the number of households 
that would actually connect to the water and sewer lines. 
This example illustrates how careful CV researchers must be in interpreting respondents' 
answers to valuation questions in a cross-cultural context. 
4. Setting Referendum Prices 
When researchers use a referendum-type elicitation procedure in administering CV surveys in 
developing countries, they have often make a simple, but costly mistake: the range of prices 
used is too narrow. They tend to set the highest referendum price too low and the lowest price 
too high. It is thus often difficult to estimate "good" valuation functions, and as a result the 
estimates of economic benefits are more uncertain than need be. 
CV researchers tend to be reluctant to set the highest referendum price high enough to choke off 
almost everyone's demand (ideally the highest price should typically be rejected by 90-95% of 
the respondents). This is in part because in developing countries CV interviews are almost 
always conducted in-person, and it is embarrassing for interviewers to ask such a high price. As 
noted above, respondents often consider the CV scenario very seriously, and, if they receive the 
highest referendum price, can be acutely disappointed that the "hypothetical" good or service is 
so expensive. This problem is exacerbated in countries with highly skewed income 
distributions. Interviewers often complain that asking such a high price is silly because everyone 
knows that people cannot afford such a price, and the interview is difficult for them to conduct. 
In effect, asking such a high price makes the interviewers look insensitive and/or uninformed. 
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This problem is compounded if there is a tendency of respondents to say "yes" to whatever 
question the interviewer asks ("compliance bias"). In this case choking off demand by asking a 
very high price is even harder, and a very high price may be even more necessary. 
For some of the same reasons, interviewers are also reluctant to ask a very low price. Such a 
question can also make interviewers seem uninformed. But there is another reason CV 
researchers often set the lowest price too high. If the agency funding the CV survey is interested 
in using the results for pricing decisions, they may simply not be interested in learning about the 
extent of demand for the good or service at very low prices because they have no intention of 
making the service available under such terms. For the funding agency, asking part of the 
sample a very low price may well seem like a waste of resources. 
5. Constructing Joint Public-Private CV Scenarios 
Many of the CV studies in developing countries have been concerned with estimating the 
demand for infrastructure services. In one important respect, the CV scenarios required for such 
surveys are considerably more complex than those used in CV surveys about environmental 
quality improvements in industrialized countries. In order to understand household demand for 
infrastructure services such as improved sewers, roads, or telecommunications, it is often 
necessary to jointly model two household decisions. 
First, a household must decide whether to support a collective decision of a community 
regarding whether or not its members are willing to share some of the capital costs of a project. 
For example, consider an infrastructure investment in sewer lines. If it could be assumed that all 
households in a particular neighborhood would connect or could be forced to connect to new 
sewer lines if they were installed, a neighborhood, collective decision on their installation might 
not be necessary. However, if this cannot be assumed, as is typically the case, then the agency 
or authority responsible for the sewerage system needs assurance that, if the sewer pipe is laid in 
a neighborhood, households will pay a predetermined amount for this infrastructure 
improvement whether or not they connect. A fiscally responsible sewer authority cannot bear the 
financial risk of installing such expensive infrastructure without some form of payment 
guarantee. From the agency's financial perspective, each household in the neighborhood should 
be required to pay some share of the sewer network installation costs--whether or not the 
household obtains a connection--because the value of its property increases simply by having the 
option to connect in the future. 
Second, a household must decide whether it will use such infrastructure if it were installed. 
Because many infrastructure projects have positive externalities and public good characteristics, 
it is plausible that a household would vote in favor of a project in the collective decision and 
agree to pay some share of the capital costs even if it decided not to use the service. Because 
these two decisions are conceptually interrelated, the CV scenario needs to present information 
to the respondent about the terms and conditions of both parts of the "deal" in order for the 
respondent to be able to make informed choice. In practice this means that a large amount of 
information may need to be conveyed to respondents. This will typically necessitate the use of 
photographs and drawings. Also, respondents are very likely to have numerous questions about 
the proposals. This will require the use of highly trained, well-informed interviewers that can 
easily depart from the questionnaire script. 
Summary 
There are some contingent valuation researchers (I count myself among them) that believe it is 
easier to administer high quality contingent valuation surveys in some developing countries than 
it is in industrialized countries. For example, response rates are typically very high in 
developing countries, and respondents are often quite receptive to listening and considering the 
questions posed. Also, interviewers are inexpensive relative to prices in industrialized 
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countries. This allows CV researchers to use larger sample sizes and conduct more elaborate 
split-sample experiments. 
But this does not mean that conducting CV surveys in developing countries is easy; just that it is 
easier than conducting CV surveys in industrialized countries. As discussed in this paper, there 
are numerous issues that arise in CV work in developing countries that demand careful attention 
in order to increase the probability that high- quality results are to obtained. 
Table 1. Willingness and Ability to Pay 
Table 2. Description, Frequency of Different "No" Responses (Semarang, Indonesia) 
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